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ABSTRACT
The relationship between interest rates and exchange rates is puzzling and poorly understood. But
under some standard assumptions, interest rates can be adjusted to smooth real exchange rate
movements at the possible price of increased volatility in other variables. In New Zealand, estimates
made under some generous suppositions about what monetary policy is able to accomplish suggest
that decreasing real exchange rate volatility by about 25% would require increasing output volatility









The primary goal of monetary policy in New Zealand is price stability.  But that is not the
sole mandate of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand.  Recent Policy Targets Agreements have
also called on the Bank to “avoid unnecessary instability in output, interest rates and the
exchange rate.”
Thus the Bank is directed to make output, interest rates and the exchange rate variables of
interest beyond the usefulness of these variables for understanding and forecasting inflation,
perhaps interpretable as a direction to trade off price stability with stability in these other
variables.  This paper considers the possibility of using interest rate policy to trade exchange rate
stability against stability in other variables.  It makes two points.  Section 2 of the paper reminds
the reader that the relationship between interest rate policy and exchange rates is quite uncertain. 
Specifically, I remind the reader of the empirical failure of “uncovered interest parity.”  In light
of such a failure, it will likely be difficult in practice to use interest rate adjustments to stabilize
exchange rates with any precision.  
The rest of the paper follows a considerable literature that ignores the reminder just
noted.  It embeds a standard interest parity relationship between interest rates and exchange rates
in a linear macro model.  It uses counterfactual calculations to supply rough quantitative
estimates of that tradeoff, focusing on stability of real exchange rates on the one hand vs.
stability of output, inflation and interest rates on the other.  The point estimates suggest that
decreasing real exchange rate volatility by about 25% would require increasing output and
inflation volatility by roughly 10% and interest rate volatility by roughly 20%. 
The estimates are derived from a simple linear model that is broadly consistent with both2
textbook and New Keynesian models.  The mechanism the Bank is assumed to use to stabilize
real exchange rates is to adjust interest rates in response to transitory movements in exchange
rates, with interest rate hikes (cuts) coming in response to transitory depreciations
(appreciations) of the New Zealand dollar.
Three cautionary notes.  First, these estimates are likely to be optimistic ones.  This is not
only because the model assumes that interest rate adjustments affect exchange rates in a reliable
and well understood way.  As well, and at a more prosaic level, the computations assume away a
host of other practical problems: they assume that the Bank knows the steady state level of the
real exchange rate, that the Bank can react to exchange rate movements as quickly as exchange
rates react to interest rate movements, that excellent data on output and inflation are available
contemporaneously, and so on.  So in practice a 25% reduction in real exchange rate volatility is
likely to be associated with greater increases in volatility of other variables than stated above.
Second, this paper does not consider the desirability of explicitly targeting real exchange
rate movements.  As indicated above, statements in recent Policy Targets Agreements serve as
my motivation to estimate a tradeoff.  I will refer to estimates of changes in volatility as the
“price” paid for targeting real exchange rate movements.  Of course, the appropriate measure of
any tradeoff is one of utility and not volatility.  The utility function to interpret the estimates is to
be supplied by the reader.  See among others Benigno and Benigno (2000),  Clarida et al. (2001),
and Kollman (2002) for formal analyses of the welfare properties of monetary rules in open
economies.  
Third, the fact that the focus of this paper is on real exchange rate stabilization should not
be interpreted as an assertion that such stabilization is the only or even most important way3
exchange rates might affect monetary policy.  In a small open economy like New Zealand’s,
exchange rates, both real and nominal, are central to understanding and forecasting the evolution
of inflation and output.  I take this point as given, and consider the separate question of the cost
of real exchange rate stabilization.
Section 2 of the paper notes the uncertainty of the link between interest rates and
exchange rates.  Section 3 presents the model.  Section 4 presents empirical results.  Section 5
concludes.  An Appendix includes some algebraic details.
2. UNCERTAIN INTEREST PARITY
For countries with roughly similar inflation rates, exchange rate changes are hard to
predict.  In my view, they are even harder to predict than are stock price changes, which are
notoriously difficult to predict.  Indeed, a vast literature studying exchange rate prediction has
concluded that the best single predictor of the exchange rate next period–tomorrow, next week,
next month, maybe even next year–is the exchange rate this period.  One generally cannot do
better than a “no change” forecast for exchange rates.  The seminal reference is Meese and
Rogoff (1983); a recent update is Cheung et al. (2002).
Those unfamiliar with the exchange rate models may think this “random walk” result is
precisely what is predicted by classic efficient markets theory as exposited by Samuelson (1965). 
But in fact this is not the case.   Explaining why not will take us to the “uncovered interest
parity” relationship that is the central link between interest rates and exchange rates in
macroeconomic models such as the one developed and estimated in this paper.
Recall that the essence of Samuelson’s (1965) model is not that asset prices changes are4
unpredictable but that asset returns are unpredictable.  Samuelson explicitly noted that if an asset
pays a dividend in a given time period, the asset’s return (sum of dividend and price change) will
be unpredictable only if there is, on average, an offsetting movement in the asset price.  For
equity returns, for example, this means that the day a stock goes ex-dividend, its price should
fall, on average, by the amount of the dividend.  And indeed this implication has been found to
be more or less consistent with the behavior of U.S. stock price data (an early reference is Elton
and Gruber (1970)), at least once one takes into account complications induced by taxes and
transactions costs.
The reader may wonder what a discussion about dividends has to do with exchange rates. 
It is of course true that holding foreign currency does not automatically entitle one to earn money
labeled “dividends.”  But from the point of view of Samuelson’s (1965) efficient markets theory,
interest payments on nominally riskless government debt play precisely the role of dividends.  
To see why, let us define the following notation:
(2.1) it: interest rate in New Zealand,
 i
*
t: interest rate in foreign country,
st: log nominal exchange rate, measured as $NZ/foreign currency,
Et: mathematical expectations conditional on a period t information set.
I follow the convention that a  higher value of st denote a weaker (depreciated) currency.  
In the notation of (2.1), uncovered interest parity may be written:5
(2.2) it = i
*
t + Etst+1 - st.
The left hand side is the return from investing in domestic (New Zealand) bonds.  The right hand
side is the expected return from the following investment: convert from New Zealand dollars to
foreign currency, buy the foreign bond that pays i
*
t, convert the proceeds back to New Zealand
dollars.  If investors are risk neutral, as assumed by Samuelson (1965), equality of expected
returns should hold, and equation (2.2) follows.   (For example, if the New Zealand interest rate
it is (say) 4 percent higher than the foreign interest rate i
*
t, then our hypothetical investor must
expect that by investing abroad he will earn 4 percent via depreciation of the New Zealand dollar
[Etst+1-st =.04] .)   Alternatively, investors cannot expect to make money by borrowing at rate it
and investing abroad.  In (2.2), the expected asset price change is Etst+1-st, while the net
“dividend” is i
*




Observe that uncovered interest parity (2.2) states that exchange rate changes are
predictably related to interest rate differentials; according to uncovered interest parity, exchange
rates do not follow a random walk.  I began this section by noting that exchange rate changes are
unpredictable, which means in particular that they are not well predicted by interest rate
differentials.  This is illustrated by Figures 1(a)-1(c), which present scatterplots of begin of
quarter 90 day interest rate differentials (horizontal axis) with subsequent quarterly percentage
changes in nominal exchange rates (vertical axis), for the New Zealand dollar versus the
currencies of Australia (Figure 1a), Japan (1b) and the U.S. (1c).   The sample period is 1986:2-
2003:1.  The interest rate differentials are expressed at quarterly rates.  Were uncovered interest6
parity to hold, the dots would be scattered around a forty five degree line.  No such pattern is
evident.  Indeed, the point estimate of correlation between the two series is negative for the U.S.
and Japan, and the estimated positive correlation for Australia is insignificantly different from
zero.   A vast literature finds similar results.  See Lewis (1995) for a general survey and Razzak
and Margaritis (2002) for recent New Zealand evidence. 
So fitting the historical data requires the addition of variables to (2.2).  In the empirical
work presented below, I take the tack of appending a serially correlated shock, call it urt; the “r”
stands for “risk premium:”
(2.3) it - i
*
t  = Etst+1 - st + urt.
In this empirical work, I use historical data and regression residuals to construct a series for urt
(and other unobserved shocks, though such shocks are not important at the moment).  When I
trace out the effects of alternative interest rate policies, I assume that the time series for urt is
invariant to such policies.  That is, ceteris paribus, movements in it lead one-to-one to
movements in expected exchange rate depreciation, where one of the cetera held fixed is urt. 
This may not be a good assumption, but it arguably is as good as any.  A good assumption about
how urt will change as monetary policy changes requires a good model for the shock urt.  We do
not have such a model.   Possible explanations for urt include a risk premium generated as the
usual  covariance with the market portfolio (e.g. Backus et al. (2001)) or misperceptions about
determinants of exchange rates (e.g., Gourinchas and Tornell (2002)).  Each explanation has
substantial empirical or theoretical difficulties.7
The lesson to be drawn is that the results about to be developed and presented need to be
interpreted with an unusual amount of caution.
3. THE MODEL
A. Specification
The model is broadly consistent with recent New Keynesian work on monetary policy in
small open economies, such as Galí and Monacelli (2002).  An IS curve, a Phillips curve, a
monetary policy rule and an interest parity equation are specified for New Zealand.  These are
forward looking, with all dynamics and persistence due to serial correlation in exogenous
shocks.  As well, exogenous processes are posited for foreign (rest of world) output, inflation
and interest rates.
For convenience, I refer to a foreign “country”, although the empirical work defines the
foreign country as a trade weighted average of several foreign countries.  Define the following
notation in addition to that defined in (2.1):
(3.1) yt = output gap in New Zealand, y
*
t = output gap in foreign country;
pt, p
*
t: log price levels (CPI);
Bt, B
*
t: inflation (first difference of log consumer price level);
qt=st-(pt-p
*
t): log real exchange rate;
I repeat that I follow the convention in which an increase in the  exchange rate (real or nominal)
corresponds to a depreciation rather than appreciation of the New Zealand dollar.8
The IS and Phillips curve equations are:
(3.2) yt = "y*y
*
t + "qqt  - "r(it-EtBt+1)  + uyt
(3.3) Bt = $BEtBt+1 + $yyt + uBt
In (3.2) and (3.3), uyt and uBt are exogenous shocks, which in the empirical work will be serially
correlated.  Here and throughout I suppress constant terms.
The IS curve (3.2) can be justified in either of two related ways.  The first is as a
textbook open economy aggregate demand curve.  In this case, "y and "q are positive and reflect
the responsiveness of net exports to movements in foreign output y
*
t and the real exchange rate
qt; "r is negative.   A second is from New Keynesian models with certain assumptions about,
preferences, risk sharing and purchasing power parity.  For example, in Galí and Monacelli
(2002), which assumes that uncovered interest parity and instantaneous purchasing power parity,
(3.2) holds with "y* and "q functions of preference parameters and "r=0; in the particularly
simple case of logarithmic preferences, "y*=1,  "q>0 is increasing in the share of foreign
produced goods in New Zealand consumption, and uyt depends on the level of productivity in
New Zealand relative to the foreign country.
Equation (3.3) again is consistent with both textbook and New Keynesian models.  In
textbooks, $B=1; in the Calvo sticky price model, $B is a little less than 1.  In either, $y is
positive.  In both textbook and New Keynesian models, the measure of inflation that appears in
the Phillips curve is domestic rather than overall inflation Bt.  The use of overall inflation is a
shortcut that allows me to avoid modeling the pass through of exchange rates to prices.  Explicit9
modeling of pass through is an important task for future research.
I assume that monetary policy is New Zealand is adequately captured by a Taylor rule
with a serially correlated shock  umt:
(3.4) it = (BBt + (yyt + (qqt + umt
In (3.4), (B>1, (y$0 and (q$0.  The use of actual inflation is for consistency with work at the
Reserve Bank (see Drew and Plantier (2000) and Plantier and Scrimgeour (2002)).  From a
technical point of view, I could proceed if expected inflation were in the monetary policy rule
(3.4) as suggested by Huang et al. (2001); whether use of expected inflation generates
substantively different results remains to be seen.   A similar statement applies to the output gap.
The term in the real exchange rate (q is key to this study.  To interpret this term, begin by
noting that I sidestep altogether any questions about levels of variables, to focus on variability. 
Let me temporarily restore the levels, by rewriting (3.4) as follows: 
(3.4)N it - EtBt+1 = natural real interest rate +  ((B-1)(EtBt+1 - inflation target) + 
(y(log GDP - log potential output) + (q(qt - equilibrium value of qt) + umt.
We see in (3.4)N that this reaction function, which was also used in Clarida et al. (1998) and
Engel and West (2002), allows the monetary authority to lean against the transitory movements
in the real exchange rate.  The larger is (q, then, the more does monetary policy attempt to lean
against such transitory movements.   (Whether it is reasonable to allow reaction to10
contemporaneous  real exchange rates is discussed briefly below.)  The empirical work proceeds
essentially by tracing out how variations in (q affect volatility of output, inflation, interest rates
and the real exchange rate. 
In this empirical work, I abstract altogether from thorny questions about the determinants
of the quantities present in (3.4)N but not (3.4) (i.e., the natural real interest rate, inflation target,
potential output and equilibrium value of the real exchange rate).    The empirical work relies on
the Bank’s staff to construct potential output and the equilibrium real exchange rate, and
assumes the other quantities are constants, set equal to the mean value in the sample.  It is
technically feasible to use other deterministic models (trends, or step functions, for example)
rather than constants, but I did not do so.
The next equation is interest parity (2.3), but written in real form, and with an exogenous
risk premium shock urt:




t+1) = Etqt+1 - qt + urt.
Equation (3.5) is obtained by subtracting EtBt+1-EtB
*




t) from both sides of
(2.3).
Note that the current values of it and qt appear in the monetary rule (3.4) and in interest
parity (3.5).   The model will be solved under the assumption that the quarterly interest rate can
be set to react to the contemporaneous real exchange rate, even while the exchange rate is
reacting to interest rate movements.  There are at least two reasons why one might find it
objectionable to allow the current value of the exchange rate in the monetary policy rule.  The11
first is one familiar from recent literature on Taylor rules, namely, that data on price levels,
which are required to compute a real exchange rate, are not available contemporaneously.
The second reason, which is probably more important for the present study, is that it is
questionable that the monetary authority can react to the exchange rate (equation (3.4)) as
rapidly as the exchange rate reacts to monetary policy (one interpretation of equation (3.5)).  
Specifically, with a monetary rule in the form (3.4), it is possible for the monetary authority to
achieve very low variability in the real exchange rate by setting (q very high relative to (B and
(y.  Of course, the same applies to inflation when (B is set very high relative to (y and (q, or to
output when (y is set very high relative to (B and (q.  But the implication may be tolerable for
variables like inflation and output, in that these variables move relatively sluggishly in the
intervals between monetary policy decisions. But it is difficult to argue that exchange rates move
sluggishly between interest rate decisions.  This suggests a bound on the Bank’s ability to lower
variability in exchange rates, a bound that may not be well captured in a model that (as just
stated) allows interest rates to react to exchange rates as rapidly as exchange rates react to
interest rates.  So for this reason as well the results presented here likely understate the cost of
achieving a given reduction in exchange rate volatility.
To return to the model: equations (3.2) -(3.5) are four equations in seven variables: the






t.  To close
the model requires three more equations.  I do not attempt to model the three foreign variables,
















B. The monetary policy rule and volatility trade-offs
Is there indeed a cost to stabilizing the real exchange rate?  Might it be that setting (q>0
leads to greater stability in not only the real exchange rate but also in output, inflation and
interest rates?  These questions are prompted by the observation that optimal control typically
requires a response to all state variables.  So even if the Reserve Bank were interested only in
inflation stability, it could in principle achieve greater inflation stability with an interest rate rule
that responds not only to output and inflation but also to the real exchange rate.  If the inflation
stabilizing choice involves a positive (q, as assumed above, then the additional term in qt will be
beneficial rather than costly in terms of inflation volatility.
The aim of this paper is to use the data to supply an answer to the questions at the
beginning of the preceding paragraph.  But in simplified versions of the model, it is possible to
answer the question analytically.  And even in simplified versions, the answer is: it depends. 
Whether a monetary rule expanded to include a term (qt lessens or exacerbates volatility in other
variables depends on variances of shocks and parameter values.   Rather than catalog the
dependence exhaustively, let me illustrate with two examples.  I worked through both examples
in a simplified setting in which all shocks are i.i.d. (not plausible empirically, but tractable
analytically).  The aim is to distinguish the implications for volatility of the real exchange rate q,
output y, inflation B and the interest rate i of (q>0 vs. (q=0. 
Consider first the response to a positive shock to the risk premium urt.  For both (q=0 and13
for (q>0, the impact effect of this shock is for qt,  yt, Bt and it to rise.  This is intuitive: an
increase in exchange rate risk causes the currency to depreciate, which in turn is associated with
a rise in output and inflation.  For both (q=0 and (q>0, the monetary rule (3.4) causes interest
rates to rise in response.  But for (q>0, interest rates respond more strongly.  The stronger
interest response means that, in  equilibrium, the responses of qt, yt and Bt are less for (q>0 than
for (q=0.  Thus the rule with (q>0 lessens volatility of y and B (and of course q) but increases
volatility of i.
As a second example, consider instead the effect of positive IS shock uyt, interpreted in
Galí and Moncaelli (2002) as an increase in productivity in the home country (New Zealand, in
the present application) relative to abroad.  For both (q=0 and for (q>0, qt falls (appreciation), 
yt, Bt and it rise.  The effects on qt, yt and Bt are intuitively expected; the rise in it is necessary to
maintain interest parity.  The equilibrium increase in it is less for (q>0 than for (q=0 (because qt
falls).  So volatility of it is lower for (q>0.  Consequently,  volatility of yt and Bt increases.
These two examples illustrate that one cannot tell a priori whether the addition of the
term (qt to the monetary policy rule will lessen or increase volatility of other variables.  For the
effect on volatility of output, inflation and interest rates is directly opposite for the two shocks:
Volatility more (+) or less (-) for (q>0 than for (q=0?
iyB q
Risk premium shock + - - -
IS shock - + + -
The volatility of q is unambiguously lessened by including (qt in the monetary rule.  The
previous analysis illustrates that whether inclusion of the term lessens or increases volatility of
other variables depends on the variances of the shocks and on model parameters.   Even in an14
i.i.d. world, one would have to turn to data to decide the sign of the change in volatility of
output, inflation and interest rates.  (N.B.: the point of this subsection is illustration, and not
development of a complete set of comparative statics results that could be used to interpret the
empirical results.  In presentation of results, I will have occasion to refer to this subsection only
to remind the reader that real exchange rate smoothing may result in either increases or decreases
of volatility of other variables.)
C. Model solution and identification
Define the (7×1) vectors Xt and Ut as













With suitable definitions of (7×7) matrices A1 and A0, the system (3.2)-(3.8) may be written as
(3.10) A1EtXt+1 + A0Xt = Ut.
The form of the solution to (3.10) depends on the nature of the shock process Ut.  It is




1Ut and EtXt+1=0.  Clearly if this model is to pick up serial correlation that is manifest in
aggregate data, the shock Ut will have to be serially correlated.  An assumption that is
technically manageable, and leads to serial correlation in Xt that is roughly what we see in the
data, is that Ut follows a vector autoregression of order 1:15
(3.11) Ut = MUt-1 + Wt.
Here, M is the  (7×7) matrix of autoregressive coefficients M and Wt is the serially uncorrelated
(7×1) vector of innovations in Ut.
It may be shown that (3.10) and (3.11) imply that Xt also follows a vector AR(1), say
(3.12) Xt = FXt-1 + Vt.
Here, F depends on both the parameters of the model embedded in A0 and A1 (that is, on "y*, "q,
$B, $y, (B, (y, (q) and the serial correlation parameters M; the serially uncorrelated shock Vt is a
linear transformation of the shock vector Wt, with the parameters of the transformation again
dependent on both the model parameters and M.  See the Appendix.
Clearly one can estimate F and the variance-covariance matrix of Vt by least squares. The
strategy I take to identify the model is to assume values for the model parameters "y*, "q, $B, $y,
(B, (y, (q, and let the data tell me what values of the serial correlation matrix M and the
variance-covariance matrix of Wt are consistent with the estimates of F and EVtVtN.  The values I
impose on the model parameters are ones that are presumed to apply during the period of
estimation.  For example, I set the monetary policy parameter (q to zero on the thought that
exchange rate smoothing has not played a detectable role in New Zealand monetary policy
during my sample.  At any rate, given the assumed values, one can map the estimates of F and of
the variance-covariance matrix of Vt into estimates of M and of the variance-covariance matrix of
Wt.  I allow M to be unrestricted–that is, I do not attempt restrictions conventional in calibration16
work, such as univariate AR(1) processes for all shocks.   My aim is to well-capture the dynamic
behavior of the data, recognizing since all the dynamics are in the shocks I provide an
accounting but not an economic explanation of the persistence in the data.
I also do not attempt to test for or impose unit roots or cointegrating relations (though this
setup in principle allows M to have eigenvalues with unit modulus).   Rather, I take it as a priori
reasonable that the variables here are stationary, though mean reversion might be quite slow.
To trace out the effects of alternative policies to smooth exchange rates, I vary (q in
(3.4), holding fixed other model parameters and the serial correlation matrix M.  This allows me
to solve for how F and Vt would have varied, had the Reserve Bank of New Zealand followed a
policy with alternative parameters.  (Formulas are in the Appendix.)  To summarize variation in
F and Vt, I report implied standard deviations around steady state of New Zealand interest rates,
output, inflation and the real exchange rate.  My presumption is that if the variations in policy
are suitably modest, serial correlation parameters and steady state values can reasonably be held
fixed while policy parameters are varied.  And similarly for the model parameters in the IS and







t by assumption evolve exogenously (equations (3.6)-(3.8)).
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
A. Data
The data are quarterly, 1992:1-2002:3.  Specific variables (names from the Bank’s model
or data series given in quotes when applicable) are:17
y (NZ output gap: “gap”): the output gap
B (NZ inflation): headline CPI inflation
i (NZ interest rate: “r90d”): 90 day bank bill rate
q (real exchange rate: “z”): five country trade weighted index, constructed with GDP
deflators
y* (foreign output gap: “gaprow”): fourteen country trade weighted output gap
B* (foreign inflation: “cpirow”): five country trade weighted CPI
i* (foreign interest rate): five country trade weighted 90 day interest rates
In q, B* and i*, the five countries are: Australia, United States, United Kingdom, Germany/Euro
area and Japan.   In y*, the fourteen countries are: United States, Japan, Germany, France, United
Kingdom, Italy, Canada, Australia, China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, and
Taiwan.
Figure 2 plots the data from 1986-2002, with a vertical line denoting the start of the 1992
sample that I use.  Note that the scale in the graphs is different; interest rates i and inflation B
generally are higher in New Zealand than in the foreign country (i* and B*).  Note as well that
the exchange rate series is plotted in levels, but appears in logs in the regressions.  
The figure suggests that the data are generally slowly mean reverting.  Indeed, one reason
for beginning the sample in 1992 rather than 1986 was to avoid having to model the downward
trend in New Zealand inflation B and interest rates i.  But even in the post-1992 sample, the
figures suggest that mean reversion has been more honored in the breach than in the observance
for some variables, including in particular the foreign interest rate i* and the New Zealand output18
gap y.  The empirical work implicitly interprets the seeming trend in these variables as a
reflection of a small sample, since this work assumes the data are stationary around a constant
mean.  Alternative treatments of trends would be desirable, but are not considered in this paper.
B. VAR Results







in Table 1.  Predictably, lagged dependent variables typically earn coefficients that are
numerically large and statistically significant, with the peculiar exceptions of inflation Bt and
foreign inflation B
*
t.  As one would expect, there is more evidence that foreign variables Granger
cause New Zealand variables than vice versa: B
*
t Granger causes Bt (t-value of 0.37/0.11 . 3.4)
and i
*
t Granger causes it (t-value of 0.32/.12 . 2.7).  The New Zealand output gap yt does Granger
cause the foreign output gap(t-value of .09/.04 .2.3),  perhaps a manifestation of what Bank
economists have described to me as a tendency for the New Zealand output gap to have led the
foreign output gap in recent years.  The real exchange rate is statistically significant in the
inflation and interest rate equations with numerically small coefficients of 0.05 and -0.02.
Most other coefficients are numerically small and statistically insignificant, suggesting a
population value of zero or thereabouts; such  zeroes would be rationalized in the model
described in section 2 by a particular pattern of zeroes in the matrix M (defined in 3.11).  
(We do see some nonzero coefficients on variables other than own lags in the equations






t.  To clarify, such nonzero coefficients in the equations for
foreign variables are rationalized by multivariate linkages between the various shocks.  For
example, let us use the estimates in Table 1 and the formulas in the Appendix to construct the
equation for the exogenous process for foreign inflation B
*






















t-1 in the B
*
t equation reported in Table 1.)
C. Effects of alternative monetary policy rules
Alternative values for the parameters "y*, "q, "r, $B, $y, (B, (y, and (q are presented in
Table 2.  My aim is to choose values more or less consistent with the structural models used at
the RBNZ.  My understanding is that one or more RBNZ models use a within-quarter elasticity
of the New Zealand output gap with respect to world output of 1.5, with respect to the real
exchange rate of about 0.15–hence the values for "y* and "q.  These models find it difficult to
find a within-quarter effect of the interest rate, but there is some evidence that the elasticity may
be as high as 0.5, so I set "r=0 or "r=0.5.  (Of course, even with "r=0 monetary policy affects






t, equations (3.2)-(3.5) determine the
values of yt, Bt, it and qt simultaneously.)  Setting $B=0.99 is consistent with quarterly calibration
of the Calvo model, and, more generally, with a more or less long run vertical Phillips curve. 
The value $y=0.1-0.2 is consistent with my understanding of estimates of the short run slope of
the Phillips curve in New Zealand.  The monetary policy parameters ((B=1.5, (y=0.5 and (q=0)
seem, I am told, to do as good a job as any if New Zealand monetary policy is to be described via
a Taylor rule (Drew and Plantier (2000) and Plantier and Scrimgeour (2002)).
Panel A of Table 3 reports actual standard deviations of the data.  The other panels of20
Table 3 report the results of varying (q, the reaction coefficient on the real exchange rate in the
monetary policy rule (3.4).  Panel B reports detailed results for parameter set A.  As (q increases,
the volatility of q of course falls.  According to the estimates, if (q had been set to 0.07–a value
consistent with some of the estimates for G7 countries in Clarida et al. (1998)–the volatility of q
would have fallen by 24%, from 10.94 to 8.34.  The price paid for a smoother exchange rate is an
11% increase in output volatility (from 1.55 to 1.72), a 2% increase in inflation volatility (from
1.13 to 1.16) and a 18% increase in interest rate volatility (from 1.58 to 1.98).  (These are
standard deviations centered around steady state values–around long run equilibrium real
exchange rate, potential output, target inflation, and average interest rate.  And–to repeat an
important point already made in the introduction–it is the welfare effects of exchange rate
targeting, and not volatility per se, that is the appropriate metric to measure the desirability of
targeting.)
To facilitate interpretation, I present results for other specifications when (q has been set
at a value that decreases volatility of q by about 25%.  Results for all three parameter sets are
given in Table 3C; the results for parameter set A repeat what is in panel B.  The results are
broadly consistent across parameter sets.
The results may be contrasted with those of Brook and Stephens (2002) and Lam (2003). 
Brook and Stephens (2002) use the Reserve Bank’s FPS model to consider the effect of adding
to that model’s reaction function a term that smooths real exchange rates.  Brook and Stephens
do not present standard deviations.  But they interpret some impulse responses as suggesting that
such smoothing would induce “significantly” greater volatility in inflation, while yielding less
volatility in not only real exchange rates but perhaps interest rates as well. 21
Lam (2003) builds on Hunter (2001) in using a calibrated version of Svensson’s (2000)
open economy model.  His estimates vary widely across specifications.  In one set of results (top
panel of Table 3 on p10 of Lam (2003)), reducing real exchange rate variability by 15% causes
the variability of other variables to skyrocket: the standard deviation of inflation more than
triples, that of output increases by 50%, that of the nominal interest rate doubles.  (This panel
only present results for a reductions in real exchange rate variability of 15% or less.)   In two
other sets of results (middle and bottom panels of Table 3 on p10 of Lam 2003), reducing real
exchange rate variability by 25% causes the standard deviations of inflation and output to
increase by perhaps 5-20%, while that of the interest rate falls by about 15-20%.  (Recall from
the discussion in section 3 that even in this paper’s model, an attempt to smooth exchange rates
can lessen interest rate volatility as well, depending on the source of shocks.)  
These results seem broadly consistent with those presented here, in the sense of
suggesting a substantial volatility cost would be paid for smoothing real exchange rates.  There
is, however, an uncomfortably wide range of results (would interest rates be more or less
variable if exchange rates were smoothed?).  This underscores the imprecision of our
understanding of the terms of the tradeoff between real exchange rate stability and stability of
other variables. 
5. CONCLUSIONS
The simple model used in this paper delivers rough estimates of the cost of using interest
rate policy to smooth real exchange rate movements.  The cost is measured in terms of increased
volatility of inflation, output and interest rates.  Specifically, it is estimated that a 25% fall in the22
standard deviation of the real exchange rate can be accomplished at the price of increases in the
standard deviations of output of about 10-15%, of inflation volatility by about 0-15% and of
interest rate volatility by about 15-40%.
The empirical work abstracts from well-known difficulties with uncovered interest parity,
assuming that whatever shocks to interest parity occurred during the sample would have also
occurred had the Bank been following an alternative interest rate policy.  As well, the model is
highly simplified and stylized, for example not distinguishing between domestic and overall
inflation.  Finally, the model makes assumptions that quite likely lead to an understatement of
the cost to the RBNZ of exchange rate stabilization.  Specifically, the model assumes that the
RBNZ knows the equilibrium value of the real exchange rate, and can react to exchange rate
movements as quickly as the exchange rate reacts to interest rate movements.  A priority for
future research is relaxation of such assumptions.  This would lead to higher costs associated
with any given level of real exchange rate smoothing.  23
APPENDIX
This appendix presents formulas linking the reduced form and structural equations. 
Those equations are repeated here for convenience:
(A.1) Structural equations: A1EtXt+1 + A0Xt = Ut, Ut = MUt-1 + Wt, EWtWtN=SW,
(A.2) Reduced form equations: Xt = FXt-1 + Vt, EVtVtN/SV.
To solve for reduced form parameter matrix F and shock Vt given the structural
parameters A1, A0, M and SW, guess a solution of the form
(A.3) Xt=DUt,
where D is a matrix to be determined.  Upon using (A.3) and (A.3) led one period in (A.1), we
obtain
(A.4) A1DM + A0 = I,
which can be used to solve for D.  Upon combining (A.2) and (A.3), we see that 
(A.5) F = DMD
-1, Vt=DWt.
To work from the reduced form to the structure: given A1 and A0, whose values are
imposed a priori, and least squares estimates 
^ F and 
^ SV, the solutions for 
^ M and 
^ SW are:
(A.6)
^ D = (A1
^ F+A0)
-1, 










Backus, David K., Silverio Foresi and Chris I. Telmer, 2001, “Affine Term Structure Models and
the Forward Premium Anomaly,” Journal of Finance LVI(1), 279-304.
Benigno, Gianluca and Pierpaolo Benigno, 2000, “Monetary Policy Rules and the Exchange
Rate,” manuscript, London School of Economics.
Brook, Anne-Marie and Dominick Stephens, 2002, “Reducing Exchange Rate Cycles: Are We
Prepared to Accept a Wider Range of Inflation Outcomes?”, manuscript, Reserve Bank of New
Zealand.
Cheung, Yin-Wong; Menzie D. Chinn; and, Antonio Garcia Pascual, 2002, “Empirical Exchange
Rate Models of the Nineties: Are Any Fit to Survive?” mimeo, Department of Economics,
University of California B Santa Cruz.
Clarida, Richard, Jordi Galí and Mark Gertler, 1998, “Monetary Policy Rules in Practice: Some
International Evidence,” European Economic Review 42(6), 1033-1068.
Clarida, Richard, Jordi Galí and Mark Gertler, 2001, “Optimal Monetary Policy in Open versus
Closed Economies: An Integrated Approach,” American Economic Review 91(2), 248-252.
Drew, Aaron and L. Christopher Plantier, 2000, “Interest Rate Smoothing in New Zealand and
other Dollar Bloc Countries,” manuscript, Reserve Bank of New Zealand.
Elton, Edwin J. and Martin J. Gruber, 1970, “Marginal Stockholder Tax Rates and the Clientele
Effect,” Review of Economics and Statistics 52(1), 68-74.
Engel, Charles and Kenneth D. West, 2002, “Taylor Rules and the Deutchemark-Dollar Real
Exchange Rate,” manuscript, University of Wisconsin.
Galí, Jordi and Monacelli, Tommaso, 2002, “Monetary Policy and Exchange Rate Volatility in a
Small Open Economy,” manuscript, Boston College.
Gourinchas, Pierre-Olivier and Aaron Tornell, 2002, “Exchange Rate Dynamics, Learning and
Misperception,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 2002.
Huang, Angela, Margaritis, Dimitri and David Mayes, 2001, “Monetary Policy Rules in Practice:
Evidence from New Zealand,” Multinational Finance Journal 5(3), 175-200.
Hunter, Leni, 2001, “A Small Model of the New Zealand Economy,” manuscript, Reserve Bank
of New Zealand.
Kollmann, Robert, 2002, “Monetary Policy Rules in the Open Economy: Effects on Welfare and
Business Cycles,” Journal of Monetary Economics 49(5), 989-1015.Lam, Zac, 2003, “Exchange Rates in the Central Bank’s Loss Function,” unpublished
manuscript, Reserve Bank of New Zealand.
Lewis, Karen, 1995, “Puzzles in International Financial Markets,” 1913-1971 in G. Grossman
and K. Rogoff (eds), Handbook of International Economics, vol. III, Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Meese, Richard A., and Kenneth Rogoff, 1983, “Empirical Exchange Rate Models of the
Seventies: Do They Fit Out of Sample?,” Journal of International Economics 14(1), 3-24.
Plantier, L. Christopher and Dean Scrimgeour, 2002, “Estimating a Taylor Rule for New Zealand
with a Time Varying Neutral Real Rate,” manuscript, Reserve Bank of New Zealand.
Razzak, Weshah A. and Dimitri Margaritis, 2002, “Uncovered Interest Parity: The Puzzle of the
U.S. Dollar,” manuscript, University of Waikato.
Samuelson, Paul A., 1965, “Proof that Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly,”
Industrial Management Review, 6(2), 41-49.
Svensson, Lars E. O., 2000, “Open Economy Inflation Targeting,” Journal of International
Economics 50(1), 155-183.Table 1
Estimates of Vector Autoregression
Summary
Dependent ------------- Regressors --------------- Statistics
variable     yt-1       Bt-1        it-1           qt-1 y
*
t-1   B
*






yt   0.96    -0.19    -0.03     0.01    -0.24     0.01    -0.10 0.80 0.70
 (0.09)   (0.12)   (0.11)   (0.01)   (0.20)   (0.09)   (0.13)
Bt   0.13    -0.21     0.12     0.05     0.25     0.37    -0.19 0.40 0.88
 (0.12)   (0.15)   (0.14)   (0.02)   (0.25)   (0.11)   (0.16)
it     0.19     0.07     0.58    -0.02     0.28     0.05     0.32 0.82 0.67
 (0.09)   (0.11)   (0.10)   (0.01)   (0.19)   (0.09)   (0.12)
qt  -1.05    -0.05    -0.36     0.93     2.43     0.50    -0.31 0.95 2.53
 (0.33)   (0.42)   (0.39)   (0.05)   (0.72)   (0.33)   (0.47)
y
*
t   0.09     0.04    -0.13    -0.01     0.78    -0.02     0.03 0.83 0.29
 (0.04)   (0.05)   (0.05)   (0.01)   (0.08)   (0.04)   (0.05)
B
*
t   0.19    -0.33    -0.13     0.01     1.02    -0.31     0.54 0.35 1.07
 (0.14)   (0.18)   (0.17)   (0.02)   (0.30)   (0.14)   (0.20)
i
*
t   0.01     0.16    -0.11    -0.01     0.00     0.05     0.96 0.91 0.32
 (0.04)   (0.05)   (0.05)   (0.01)   (0.09)   (0.04)   (0.06)
Notes:
1. The data are quarterly, 1992:II-2002:III.
2. Variable definitions: y=output gap, i=interest rate, B=inflation, q=real exchange rate, “*”
denotes foreign variables.Table 2
Model parameters
 "y* "q "r $B  $y (B (y (q
A 1.5 0.15 0.0 .99 0.1 1.5 0.5 0.0
B 1.5 0.15 0.5 .99 0.1 1.5 0.5 0.0
C 1.5 0.15 0.0 .99 0.2 1.5 0.5 0.0
Notes:
1. For variables defined in notes to Table 1, and with“u” denoting a shock, the equations of the
model are as follows.  IS curve: yt = "y*y
*
t + "qqt-"r(it-EtBt+1)+ uyt; Phillips curve: Bt = $BEtBt+1 +
$yyt + uBt ; monetary policy: it = (BBt + (yyt + (qqt + umt.  Table 3
Standard Deviations Under Alternative Monetary Policy Parameters, 1992-2002
A. Standard deviations under actual policy
---------Standard deviation of--------
    q      y       B       i
10.94      1.55      1.13      1.58
B. Standard deviations under hypothetical alternative policies, parameter set A
Parameter ---------Standard deviation of--------
Set (q     q      y       B       i
A. 0.00 10.94      1.55      1.13      1.58
0.01 10.47      1.58      1.13      1.62
0.05   8.95      1.68      1.14      1.78
0.07   8.34      1.72      1.16      1.86
0.10   7.56      1.78      1.19      1.98
C. Cost of Lowering Real Exchange Rate Volatility by About 25%, Alternative Parameter Sets
Parameter Percentage increase in standard deviation
Set (q     q      y       B       i
A 0.07 -24    11        2        18
B 0.06 -26    14        3      16
C 0.08 -24      9      13      40
Notes:
1. Variable definitions are given in Table 1.
2. (q is the coefficient on the real exchange rate in the monetary rule (2.4), it = (BBt + (yyt + (qqt
+ umt.  The standard deviations in the (q=0 line of panel B match those in panel A by
construction, because it is assumed that during the estimation period, the rule was followed with
(q=0.
3. The negative sign in the q column in panel 3C means that the volatility of q has fallen.Figure 1
Interest Differentials vs. Subsequent Changes in Nominal Exchange Rates
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eFigure 2: Basic Data 
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